Article  /  Volume 27, Issue 4  /  October 2026

Unanimity in EU Economic Statecraft: Decision-Making Constraints and Reform Options

Andreea-Alexandra BADULESCU, Gheorghe HURDUZEU

Published
October 2026
Volume & issue
27 (4)
Pages
809–820
DOI
10.24818/RMCI.2026.4.809

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Abstract

This conceptual article examines whether unanimity constitutes an inherent structural problem for diplomacy or whether its dysfunctional character depends on the specific form it takes and the economic diplomacy instrument it constrains.

Drawing on illustrative cases from EU Common Foreign and Security Policy practice and applying Pirozzi's (2026) four-type taxonomy as its analytical framework, the study argues that unanimity is not uniformly problematic. Necessary unanimity, constitutionally embedded, fulfils a legitimacy function and must be distinguished from instrumental unanimity, where veto power extracts concessions on unrelated issues, and from negotiable unanimity, where accommodation costs erode effectiveness. The costs of unanimity vary across instruments: sanctions are most sensitive to delays, trade agreements are vulnerable to hollow implementation, and financial mechanisms face exposure to inevitable unanimity through procedural constraints. The article connects EU institutional law, economic diplomacy theory, and formal bargaining theory to produce a differentiated analytical framework enabling targeted, Treaty-compliant reform proposals.

Keywords

economic diplomacy; EU Common Foreign and Security Policy; qualified majority voting; sanctions; multilateral decision-making

JEL classification

D71; F51; F53; F55

How to cite

Andreea-Alexandra BADULESCU, Gheorghe HURDUZEU (2026). Unanimity in EU Economic Statecraft: Decision-Making Constraints and Reform Options. Review of International Comparative Management, 27(4), 809–820. DOI: 10.24818/RMCI.2026.4.809